Capt. 

I have the honor to submit to you the following report of the part taken in the battle of Sharpsburg on the 17th inst. by 3d Regt. Brigade, the Command of which devolved upon me by his being in Command of the Division.

On the morning of the 17th I was ordered by Gen. Burnet to place the brigade in position across the road leading from Sharpsburg to the left side of the Union bridge over Antietam Creek, and to defend the bridge. Hardly had I received this order, when the division commenced to move to the left, and I received another order from him to detach two regiments of his brigade and send them towards Williamsport in pursuit of the enemy. Carrying out this order I left two regiments under Col. William and his two regiments under Col. John R. Carne. With these two regiments I proceeded to the bridge and placed them in position as ordered.

After a long distance below the bridge for some distance above it the ground rose too steeply from the creek for fifty or sixty yards, and it was
The face of the slope was covered with fuchs,
thirty, tea-tan and trees — in one place, on the left it
had a sort of pit large enough to hold twenty or
thirty men. Behind the trees at the top of the
slope slope was a rail fence. Along the face
of this slope among the trees in a rather irregular
line to cut the ground. I placed the
two regiments — the second on the right and
the twentieth on the left — with the line of the
twentieth extending forty or fifty yards above
the bridge, then the greater part of the line was
placed below the bridge. This disposition was
adopted because the side on the bridge on the
other side of the Creek ran from below a the
bend of the Creek near the water for one or
two hundred yards. The rails were taken from the
flanks and bolted up against such trees as were
favorably placed, where there were no such trees
the rails were laid in the stream. These made
baricades for men and for between afforded to
men by lying behind them considerable shelter against
small arms. Such obstacles would assist in
the preservation of which the regiments had to
help. The Creek was fordable even where above
and below the bridge, in most places, not
more than two yards deep. The hillside occupied
by the regiments was on the left commanded
by a high ridge. About two hundred yards
beyond the Creek and throughout by good
positions for cannon at the distance of from
five to ten hundred yards beyond the Creek.
Fleets and skirmishes were from
them visits across the Creek around hundred,
yards to the front. Thursday passed off without much notice, with an occasional shot from three guns. At 12 o'clock the next day except that the shelling was heavier and that a large number of small arms fire was thrown across the crest from Capt. Estanks' Battery at small parts of the enemy as they showed themselves, and at a point in which it was supposed the enemy lay concealed.

The next morning early, that is about 7 o'clock, the shelling was renewed. It continued constantly, growing heavier on the part of the enemy that about 9 o'clock, when on the north...

At about 9 o'clock Capt. Estanks discovered a large body of the enemy opposite to him in a wood within range of guns. He opened fire on them and drove them in confusion from the wood, and lost, to judge from the movement of their Ambulances, that long after the battle had finished this wood it was ordered away. Thus the two regiments were left at the bridge with the Artillery in front what was the general line of battle of the Army in so many miles quite three quarters of a mile in their rear and not a single gun between them and that line. The intervening ground for a great part of the way was a long slope facing the enemy, but this was commanded by those batteries to which reinforcements of they had been sent would have been cut off by shells before they could have reached their destination. A Regiment had been posted on the left for this reason.
In the attack but this soon after the battle commenced. It moved to its front and went to the rear.

Thus the two regiments were posted as infantry supports under constant expectation of receiving any reinforcements. The first to fight numbered not more than three hundred and fifty men and officers; the second having only ninety. Deverell's regiment, consisting of not fewer than two hundred and fifty. By this time was advancing with orders of not fewer than 12,000 or 18,000 men with 260 men as a rearguard. In this forewarned condition came the two regiments. At about 9 o'clock when the battle opened in earnest. At this time the infantry, supporting as it was by the fire of many pieces of artillery, advanced in heavy force to the attack. And thus the action opened on one whole line as far up as the bridge. It was bold and persevering. The firing came to the crest. The fire not only from the infantry, but from the artillery, was incessant. The artillery being so placed that it could fire over the heads of the infantry. It was met by a rapid, well directed and unflinching fire from one man each with the enemy after a vain struggle to break and drive back. This attack was succeeded by two 0 cavalry ones from apparently fresh bodies of troops and with like results, the last of the two extending about the bridge to the upper part of our line. At length the enemy to the close the enemy position for a if.
formidable attack. A battery was placed in
position from which it could enfilade the whole face of the hill
occupied by our troops. Soon it opened its fire
and the infantry in much heavier force than at
any time before extended far above as
well as below the bridge again advanced in
the attack. The combined fire of infantry
and artillery was terrific. It was however
withstood by our men until the Ammunition
tower was quite expended and until the enemy
had got upon the bridge and above and below
in finding the break. I then gave the order
to fall back. Captain Jones Col Cumming
with his Companies which had a few rounds of
Ammunition left remained near the bridge as
a little rear guard and was with these the
last to leave the ground. When he left it the
enemy had crossed above and below him in
coming upon part his flanks. They made
Cutoff a few of his men by cutting to his rear.
The men of both regiments though threat-
ing both different looks were exposed for
a long distance to the shell of the enemy.
Under an order received from Gen. Stone, they
retired to a position near the right of the general
line of attack. They at no time believed us to
be new from the bridge, but we had been at
long enough to enable Line any breach of Gen.
A. Halleck to reach their position in the line of
battles and this I suppose was attempting the
great object of defending a place so far in
front of that line of battles a place so extended

as was the bridge.

The Second regiment lost in Kells and wounded forty two. Nearly half of its men.

Amongst its killed was St. Cathal O'Flannery, a good officer and as gallant a man I think as my eye ever beheld.

The loss of the 26th in Kells wounded and missing was but a sight more than a fourth of its number. No words of mine in praise of officers or men are needed. The simple story is eloquent enough. I must however be witness to one fact. During that long and terrible fire not a man except a wounded one fell out and went to the rear — not a man.

The loss of the enemy was heavy. Near the bridge they lay in heaps. Their own estimate as a partial regiment of one later at the bridge told me was at from 500 to 1000 men. He also told me that Gen. McDowell sent out an order from Gen. McClellan that orders be brought to the bridge and what it might and that they should advance to the attack, and Col. Armstrong counted seven flags on the bridge.

Shortly before the fight at the bridge terminated the fifteenth and seventeenth by forced marches had returned from Williamsport by way of Shepherdstown and when that fight terminated they were in line of battle on the right and four or five hundred yards in advance of the general line of battle which was along
The summit of the Acabat from Antietam Creek. The position they together held about 
rate of the 11th. So under Maj. Dent had been 
placed in by Gen. Stone. Who ordered me when I 
returned to the bridge to take command of 
the whole I did so. All remained in this 
position until 12th of 4 o'clock. The 
enemy made a few at the Sherman's were 
and left to the first upon. These Sherman's 
were brought up by ours and chevruliers got 
out of range. Shortly after I was put in 
command by Gen. Stone. He informed me 
that we would be relieved by Gen. Gregg's 
brigade - - that the men were 
readied by this late and used. 
and to the right of the general line for me 
As about 4 o'clock Gen. Gregg brought his 
brigade down and took our place at the 
Commander marching to the position assigned 
no. Before coming we got half way when an 
order was sent to me to occupy the march. 
About the command some distance to the left 
of what position along the road running 
with Sharpe's until 2 o'clock opposite to 
the enemy advancing from the bridge. 
This point was at a ten mile distant a half mile 
again 2 again we in the order received 
the last line with the attacking addition 
that the enemy had broken in line 
was made up to the road with not a whole 
of ours in the front. The pace was acce 
and so a double pace kept us at that 
the line of the line. 

The Command to beyond the Cornfield and in
right of the enemy. A brigade of five or six thousand men was standing in a line of battle not
five hundred yards from the road, apparently waiting for the main attack of support and none in their front nor to their
right (our left) was a man of ours to be seen. But some abandoned pieces of fence
were conspicuous. About about midway between the road and the enemy line Maj.
Ditle with his battle was in advance
The lead element under Capt. McGregor was met, the fifteenth under Col. McMillan
was met and a large part of the twelfth under Col. Cameron. Again ready for action.
Notwithstanding the brave work of the morning brought up the men. We knew
how to use a shot line. I turned the left
of this part of line to the right of the enemy and ordered it to proceed to the left of
the town to come up. Cameron knew in
without giving any of the men any chance to
the enemy. I did so with promptness and
spirit. The rest of the line as it came up
joined in the fire. The fire soon became general.
It was hot and raged. The men returned it
with vigor and showed a determination to lead
their advance. But only in about ten or
fifteen minutes a cannon or two opened
on them and the line which had already
shown signs of waning broke and fled
down the hill. I was some fifty or eight
Ditle and by the last of the line
Then Ditle ordered a pursuit and con-
whole line rapidly advanced after it
We could not see what was below the crest of the hill, but I knew that a very large force of the enemy was descending below it, for I had from our late position near three or four batteries of long guns of them smashed out from the bridge. I therefore suggested to Sir Tomm the propriety of halting the line as its numbers were so immense that it had no support behind it just before it reached the East of the hill and ordering to that East only the new armed with long range guns. This suggestion he adopted and the new armed with three guns quietly advanced to the East and opened fire on the retreating enemy. Their other force under the hill soon commenced falling back also. After getting near the crest however a large body of them hastened formed behind a line. On discerning this Sir Tomm ordered the greater part of the Command to dislodge them from following himself. After a very hot fight in which Col. Melville fell mortally wounded he succeeded in his object. But it is for him to relate what took place then as I remained behind with the small head. Our loss in this part of the battle was in numbers light. Considering the large force of the enemy and the short distance of the fire. Their loss was very heavy. The conduct of both officers and men was as far as I could see as good as it could be. It mention prime.
...name without mentioning all would be unjust. The Government needed to pay nothing of the property of those abandoned farms and it might hardly be considered if the Buena Vista Corps had once got through the long gap in our line it would have been the ruin of our whole army and that army body could we would have been destruction.

Dear Captain,

Abidec Branston

Henry J. Bennet

Capt. D. H. Del Rio

A. B.
13 Oct. 1862

Henry D. Perring
Col. Coxx

Report of Battle of Shiloh

Val XIX

Part...