Gen. H. L. Benning

Report of Battle of Gettysburg

Headquarters

Provisionals

3 July 1863

Major,

I have the honor to transmit to you the following report of the operations of the division since the defeat at Cemetery Hill, and for the other side of the Peachtree, and 1st of July, 1863.

I arrived at the place of the 1st of July, 1863, I was informed by Maj. Gen. Thomas that his division had been attacked by the left of the enemy's line, and that in that attack their line would be forced back. The enemy at a distance of about 1000 yards, and this assigned me the task of repelling the advance. In order to get to this place on the front of the enemy I was necessary to move the brigade and put it under a heavy fire. Having done this, I advanced.
in line of battle. A word intervened between us and the enemy on which it did not prevent their shells from reaching us. I saw some confusion. Completely his shots from our lines. On emerging from the woods, their position became apparent. There were a number of rifle shots heard, but they did not seem to be aimed at us. At the distance of five hundred yards, we were able to see the mountain peak or other precipitation to our left face. Much of the ground lay open. To the right four or five hundred yards from the main peak was the mountain itself with its side level and seemed almost perpendicular. The summit overlooked the peak pitch sufficiently to command it well. On the summit of the peak were three companies and a little in advance of them on a sort of cornice shelf were three others. In the right party, a number had retreated. I left the rear, or rear line of infantry as we afterwards attained. This formed the enemy's first line of battle. On the top of the mountain I expected to see to the right of the peak two thousand to three thousand. The left was just seen, and other party. This Command in the approach to the peak for nearly the whole way to the right half of these enemy extending extended the enemy's second line of infantry. Where that line crossed the gorge between the two ridges, the peak of the mountain—a point in the rear of the peak was two other companies.
This was at 7 o'clock when the right of the Brigade reached the gorge by the terrible fire from them which broke down the gorge. This what we had before. Our counter was thirteen guns to this if not a more line of infantry planted on high. The intervening Trench Heights, 1/2 mile of Bois Maubeau to right with the best that could be done and they were all open.

Then the. Our own line also became visible twenty or thirty about from hundred yards or a thousand. The part of it in our front looked to be low, dark, and gray, as I followed it. In truth it was blotted leaving from the right. They did not descend until the left was the viewing ground on the right. Therefore it was that the division was kept back. Consequently the extreme right were.

My line continued to follow it, halting once in order to prevent it from firing. At length I saw that the first line would not be able alone to carry the peak. So I advanced without waiting again. When my line reached the foot of the peak, I formed in part of the peak, the Texas men the enemy. Struggling to cross the right, the rest of the Brigade was attacked from the right.

The Texas}
The struggle lasted to the night. Crossing the
Grenier and Stone Bridge. The ground was
difficult to follow in many places. Finding
by the inconvenience of the position of the
Two Table Alleys, an attack on the face of
the enemy was to be made double
run very by heavy firing closely.
The
position was therefore not too safe
and uncertain, but it was here a
certain
front where the
enemy was driven from
their line of attack. The advance
continued until at length they were
driven completely from the place
but the Carbine with them. The three main
guns of the summit of
the other side favored the operation.
So that the Carbine is only in the front
front
the number of prisoners we take. More
I suppose than one hundred.

The next line of the enemy on the mountain
was in a position which seemed
to the Carbine to hold. The
front and rear
with fresh men to hold the
ground we had occupied. We
the site on the enemy from the adjacent
mountain was necessarily lacking along the
Summit of the peak of the hill was that.
River I
The Carbine was the only one for a
Several attempts by flank movement were made to dislodge the enemy from the right of the position, but each was repulsed. The attack was renewed about 2 o'clock on the 7th, when one of our batteries attacked the hill from which the enemy had just been driven.

Our loss was heavy, not less than forty-four men. Of the men on the left, three were killed and twenty-two wounded. Among the killed were Col. John Jones, G.O.C. of the 10th Ga. L.I., and Capt. E. L. Harris, Commanding the 2nd Ga.

Col. Jones was killed later in the action, not far from the Captured Jones. Among his men were two Lieutenants, a Sergeant, and a Corporal, who were killed. The position they held offered them a foothold with shell from their rear. The battery, making a front of one of the hill, was against the breast of the hill. The fire of the enemy was very heavy, but the men of the 2nd Ga. continued to fire, killing the enemy, and driving them back through his lines. Col. Jones was shot in the head, and with great gallantry led his men to victory. The men, with great success, overcame the enemy and drove him back. The 2nd Ga. was next, and the 10th Ga. took the position, driving the enemy back. The 10th Ga. was also very effective.
I had no means of ascertaining the precise spot of the enemy. In this situation it must have been larger of size. I concluded that the loss of life and the ground of the Conflagration was

in the latter they were removed by the enemy during the night.

We look about three

hundred prisoners in all.

The Conflagration of both

sides took place at an instant...
The conduct of both officers
and men was generally after a, I am told, excellent
under a fire from so many sides.
I have the last part of March 2nd, they advanced steadily through the open
floor of the house and drove back the
enemy occupied his line, took 1,000 of
the enemy and a number of prisoners. Their
position against the almost effort
against his utmost effort held all they had
in reserve.

The Capture of the men was
taken by the 12th Ga. Col. Jones, last night.
The 12th Ga. (Col. Jones) the part of the 17th Ga.
(Taffy) and Capt. (Col. Lodge) but the honor of the
Capture was not exclusive. The fact
they could not have taken certainly.
They could not have held the Army
if Col. Lodge on the left, battle his
death, Maj. Sheehan with the 17th Ga.
Col. Jones with the 12th Ga.
has not been the hardest kind of
fighting by great Army. Induced
their plants. Col. Jones not only
drove back the enemy, line and
refused to repeated attacks made to
proceed to taking one hundred
prisoners. The same may be said
of the 13th except that it did not
take to many prisoners.

To my Staff Capt. D. Thomas
1st of Lieut. J. E. McNeil was with
Dr. Rawley sending a message to
an "inweltered". Their Capt. I do
not that I should pass it to here the
Kent.

In the early hours the division of the staff
in the latter part of the evening
reached an end. The division of the staff felt
sensitive and was
the division of the staff.

They had shrank from the change
in the division of the staff.

The change was sensitive and
the division of the staff felt
sensitive.

The division of the staff felt
sensitive.

They performed their duties that night.

The division of the staff felt
sensitive.

At the close of the day
The fighting ceased and I employed
the night in arranging my lines,
establishing pickets, and removing the
invalids.

The last name work of
great as owing to some faullon
Take in the staff. Surgeon having upon
of the brigade's ambulances had three
of these. Made their appearance.
The General, having the whole force in front, paid no attention to the letter, in that the lake to the letter became very heavy.

By 10 o'clock that morning the enemy employed the whole weight in throwing about 2000 rounds of shot and shell on the main line. These were now forced from the front line, while advanced on the surface of the mountain. The shelling here was terrible and very extensive. The enemy could be distinctly made from our line during the whole night. The morning light this was long line completed over the other heights. It was presented to the General and he took the third line of the General, Commanding both with infantry, artillery sufficiently to support the line for its fire to pass over it the center. The fire was still growing with the fire line greatly Shorned the way forward and was therefore not as before. This of both effect and skill to surface the cay would pass over both of the lines before. Until late in the afternoon, nothing occurred. More in front lines particularly thick, little to be seen or heard. The General's division came to turn, to tell me that the General had for some hours been
withdrew from the left having
my flank entirely exposed. This
was the first notice I had of that
movement. So important to my
bravery, I immediately ordered
the strongest picket front. I could
not range to the far advanced part
of the line. Shortly afterward in a
conference with Gen. Law. Came to me.
I told him that Gen. Law instructed
me to move to crest of the hill.
I asked him what crest to look
for. He said it would be known by
that Gen. Law saw in his hand
these (making a twist of his hand).
I was much at a loss to know what
the same meant. It seemed to me
however to be in the direction of an
order that ran through the ground
lower of the ground from the left's
limits had been withdrawn and
I concluded that the object of the
order was to cause me to occupy
that ground. Consequently I im-
mediately gave Col. Hoge. orders
to take his regiment along the right
to that ground. The regiment being
at the head of the right moved off at once. In a few
minutes afterward I received what
was the same order from Gen. Law,
but they came in a very differently
form. It was to move back to
The crest of the hill from which we
had advanced the day before. I gave
The necessary arises and the three regiments were in the direction commanded. Starting out about 10 AM I heard a heavy fire in the left in the direction which Col. A. Bruce had gone. Subsequently I learned from those that after following the rear of the officer for some time the officer became separated from his own command. He placed himself in the immediate presence of two long lines of the enemy and at an acute angle to the rear with the head of his command between the two. The rear of his line went on and from that angle the two lines made up on each other. They obstructed further him until he returned to and to check their advance a little. He then fell back and arrived himself of a stone fence fought his way and not discovered without a heavy loss in the morning. He fired until his ammunition was exhausted. He was fortunate to escape and by a stroke of luck and in the smoke thought I heard a command of the enemy. He had been a stone fence and to check a man of the enemy. He came from a Colson.
between those at the enemy
The other three regiments
out on the slight loss.
The whole loss of the
Brigade in the movement to the
rear was about one hundred of
which about eight or nine belong to
the 15th Ga. Crittizon and
most of the killed
wounded. At best, for the two
days they had been sent up. The Total
was five hundred men. The loss
on the first day was about four
hundred.

The next day the 4th the
Brigade division was formed in
line of battle facing down the
enemy's line spread out to cut
the works in which it did. My
brigade was on the left of it left
sitting on that road. About twelve
oclock at night the division Comma
ments moving back toward Hagerstown
by Fairfield. My brigade bringing
up the rear.

The Brigade never make
Nothing more of much
which happened to the Brigade
until the division had crossed
the Potomac oaks. It crossed that
river at Crittizon's Ford by prairie
and found the water deep. Travel.

At dawn the next day
The division took the road from
Front Royal to Cedar by way of
At first the gap occupied by the enemy's cavalry so close to our line, as to make it difficult to pass through. Some regiments of cavalry between these two gaps - My brigade was held in check until we occupied the road (including a portion of Gen. Corzine's brigade) on a line parallel with the gap and such dispositions made by Gen. Rawlins and Ingalls, with the other brigade so placed as to enable the enemy to attack us from a mile or more to the rear and drive us to the gap.

About 11 o'clock I was informed that Gen. Crow his division would soon move the other three brigades of his division over to the Chatham road at 4 p.m. during the night and to hold the same time as the main body of the Federal forces. I remained at this position until the time believed by Gen. A. P. Halleck to be the time to follow the division. I was to overtake it as soon as possible. It is stated that Gen. Halleck was to relieve the division after dark. So I remained but it was 12 o'clock M. before I was relieved. I then started to overtake the division. When I reached the Chatham gap road I found it filled with the rear of the Long Donnan train waiting for the division that I was to join back to my own.
already passed to get by those
magnates. The artillery in the main
Tin Lizzy road was a field of no small
difficulty. It was near night
before I could do it. I succeeded
however in part by those tanks the
covered which had encamped near
I think 1/2 mile with my brigade
bivouacked two miles beyond the
side of Plant Hill.

At day break next day
The March was resumed. I halted
for an hour or more at Garcia's
Crossing (which is 1/2 mile this
side of my Camp on the right of the
road for the 15th A. K. A. C. (Col
Cats) to the ordeals that held the
Garrison road until Gin Hill
Camps should come up. I
repassed the regiment having
found the the March was at
Sueme-Rutaby Hill's Corps very close
behind me.

When near Newby's
Crossing, two men of the Chal
dy coming from the one of those
 ssidings which leads to Knoxville de
asked me to tell me that an
open gun was being toward Arnosville
to get their horses. They had
met a squad of Garfield Cavalry,
coming from the Goshen Division.
Cut off immediately and
rushed to take the regiment which
was in front to go forward and

a reconnaissance, I advanced my
formation, the advanced line on the
crossing of the road. Very soon, the
sharpening sense of danger with
those of the enemy. After sometime
and heard their hoarse but steady
I concluded to move on. Even then
leading me toward that he would
advance Col. Ootlhet before further
move. After moving on half a mile, I
stopped much to my
surprise passed over my line at
this other in tap's succession. The
has been fired by the enemy above
sharpening. My line was concealed
from the enemy by an intervening
ridge at the end of the road. So I continued
to move on undisturbed. When I
had almost reached the ford
(between Saline) I was
informed by the gunner that
I was almost reached.

A messenger came to me from
Heen Hill to report for the artillery
and it following. I do not
permit smiling. After waiting some
time then came in front of the artillery
commander. I told him from
Heen Hill to the effect that the
enemy was

and that he wished

The Command on the

and to the road by which
they had come. They had cut off the
north to do this by a route which
the bearer of the message send

Vannand of the staff reported

true.
The request seems reasonable and wise.

The enemy had evidently got a Masculin position and was staying on the right of the enemy, from which position they commanded the road at several places, including I think the ford, and they could be engaged by a front attack from a point from which they could not see them. My command was the one most conveniently situated to execute the Man who movement. I thought at night then the move to General Hill's request to send the second brigade forward a guide and I followed him with the brigade of the cozy Alabama regt. & Col. Strong - the move through the enemy's picket line get near enough to the road in the same way to command it before they discovered me. Before five was posted. I ordered Capt. Martin's battery to move and have the skirmishers reported to one of the batteries mounting light. Consequently the battery moved straight. My right was not moved to the road in a field - I moved to the right to the wood, to get near the woods to get near it. It was at first sent to the woods, to get near the wood, the wood was thick. Before I asked to stop. I moved to the right of the battery opposite the battery and then moved and advance in line of battle. Then the line moved from the wood to the battery was given. It had seen to take the
say it came having found out our presence by the long skirmishers who opened between them and St. Landry. Brannan opened the line fired upon St. Landry. The enemy was engaged 
right. I had a cannon in the opposite wood there as I heard

The war I found upon a good place for protection against this battery and a line for attacking the Cavalry on this side to return to the

I therefore halted. I now thought we had Cannon I Cavalry
secured. I had been assured by Capt. Scott, I had asked a week or a

by citizen that there was not good of land. They could go to a

excepting the one occupied by the brigade in turn to

practicable way back to Mississippi city. This road was occupied by the
brigade and all others being excluded by the Mountain it

they were the Mountain. The

and found another good place to the Mountain I could go to

the other artillery. They took a field battery

They saw as it was clear

that the enemy had entered. At the request of Gen. Well, I turned
by the enemy to return to the

many hours of two or three

of the others.
and marched at least four miles over very difficult ground. It fought a brisk fight with Cavalry and Artillery.

Such was the result. Concluded by the operation of the enemy. After the battle the enemy soldiers were taken by the armistice to the front line of the enemy.

This was a much longer report than I would have had it to be, but under the order, requisition, I do not see how it could have been shorter. Indeed, I have omitted some things about the armistice of the armistice, which are perhaps better known than I. Closing, ask to pay tribute to the men of the Brigade in this clear report. This was, as troubling to speak of either on the advance or the retreat. The rolls were arrived at Goggle, almost the same number, in which the showed to keep the left Calpea Court turned. So they showed an entrance at Calpea.
Court heard almost the same number which they shot when we left Geilisburg.

I am Major Very respectfully,

Henry Bray

Capt. W. H. Seely

A. & G.
Gettysburg

Thermopylae River

Report:
Henry G. Benning
Brig. Gen.

Return to
Gen. Benning

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