Thomaston 1st Nov 1864

To His Excellency Joseph E. Brown.

The Justices of the Inferior Court of the County of Upson have just received a communication from W. J. B. Campbell informing us that you have directed him to say to us that we cannot draw the 1/4 quarter of Relief fund until our County is help paid and the State in full to which we have to say that we have furnished Mr. James D. Whitaker with a list of all that are entitled to salt under your direction and have also paid the money for the same and have Mr. Whitaker's letter acknowledging its receipt and directing that the salt be sent to us and which we are expecting to receive every day. You will therefore be pleased to have forwarded to us the 1/4 quarter appropriate amount of the Soldiers Relief salt that may be due this County at hands by our Order.

Yours Truly,

Davis & D. Winstead, one of the Justices of the Inferior Court.
Justice Inferior
Upton Co. 1849
about soldiers ship
friend of back.
Griffin Ga Nov 3rd 1864

His Excellency

Sir: I wish to ask a few questions

To your Excellency

Does an adjutant in the Militia

at Home Rank in the Regular

line of Promotion, with Company

Officers, here;

If so what is the Rank of an Adjutant

at Home in the Militia of

a Second Class Battalion

Now will please confer a

favor by answering the above

questions

Very Respectfully

Allen H. Groom

Co A 12th Regt 3rd

Griffin Ga

As, please answer this as

soon as possible

AGB
Griffin, Ark
Nov 3, 1864

Allen D. Groover

As I have of
M'sp of Militia
The men that are left are back in town. They are tromping on the women and children. The corn that is to be stored is not bad. We in Washington do for the women and children what the soldiers could not. The corn that is to be stored is to be stored in the government bin. It is getting higher in price. Last year for government issued to a bin, each a man of the wood and a bin of corn in every city. To hope for sold them this year. It is like a great money of the town that has been made to meet the demands of the city.
So tell us how to help to be mad
and help of them congregation
when it meet to be read that
it drop ad many things to the poor
for all but all and lastly it added
the rich rich for men it the get
money from many rich men are
all ways turned up and bad
for men to carry it one all the
for men is know in the lord
for rich man is after a consent
to stay at home and all the gain
farmer has to stand on this
battles field if you will can not
sum of the but men and that
you have 1912 to and and send him
farmer to self must of course
be kept up the if to mean
dollar and to many men at the
lord and not a doing meaning with
When I fell up and sickly and dits you will have to call out your colored and govern on your and slave holder to end your work your aday camp since had a negro at the front and is runaway and com home and know he so he is glad of it I want you to have a law a little like on the black one than you do on the white now I want you to cole your aday camp and his current to the front you aday camp and take it a son is not a mark in your policy and call the him the red walk a for suck adges of the do on happen to come home and has a negre as not facted no mor the negre of a settlin of afrin and the role at them a grand ther or house I want you to col out any hang and he is the color the aday and I do want them
I think that they ought to have better to put in to the front and send some of the farmers who will work you can expect government to fill the war and would do if you will cut out yourself given your ady em and release that you have got brothers here call them out and send back the little boy that release is able to fight for your ady camp some as a sedative and call him out to fight the guard keep up you as a robber the grave yard and cattle. To you no what a able hooded men your ady company since if he has hope raise that quarter and I want him to do that heart in fighting the fire money rich men improved at movement because up a rich men that at no time to half a second than a fairness after all the for
Pride's Camp near Florence, S.C.
Nov. 5, 1863

His Excellency, Joseph E. Brown, Gov.
Dear Sir,

I learn that Lieut. Col. H. Henderson is an applicant for the appointment of Selecter, 2nd. of the Chattahoochee Circuit, and as a friend of his, the latest of stating to you that I regard him fully competent to discharge the duties of the office he seeks. As far as I have been able to judge, he has been a faithful soldier and good officer. He has been in the service since the opening of the war and is one of those persons whose moral character improved instead of suffering under the temptations incident to camp life. The Lieut. is a man of quite limited circumstances with a large and growing family. If you can consistently with your sense of duty give him the appointment he desires you will confer a great favor on him and much oblige.

Your friend,

Capt. Scott
Capt. 13. S. S. L.,

Army Missionary,
Livingston Co., Miss.
Columbus, March 4, 1864

My friend

Mr. Thomas. The name of Chalatoseetoe county
will be an applicant for the seat of the
of the Chalatoseetoe Court. I have known
the Brown a few years as a
a gentleman of fine abilities and doubts
would fill the position with which he seeks
with credit to himself & honor to the State.

Respectfully,

B. T. Thornton
To His Excellency
S. E. Brown
Honoured Sir,

I am induced
To address this communication to
you, in behalf of a neighbour and
an intimate acquaintance, Mr. William
Brooks, and his wife and children
To the end, that justice may be
done, being fully persuaded that
you will, judging from the interest
you have shown in my petition, in
behalf of the citizen and soldiers
of the Commonwealth of Georgia,
if you have any authority in the
prefixes, and believe it to be with
your relative's prayer and duty, bring your influence
To bear, in the case herebefore
To your notice.

Mr. Brooks is about
has a wife, in delicate health,
and four small children.
The eldest a girl. He has a
farm, some stock, also a negro
woman with her four small
children. She is an industrious
man and one of strict integrity
And morality a consistent mem-
ber of the Baptist Church. Some
years ago, he was thrown from
a saddle and felt one of his
humerous dislocated, which has
never been reduced. One of his
legs is in consequence short six
inches shorter than the other. You
will readily perceive from this
statement of facts that he can
not be regarded as an able bodied
man, and that he is certain
unable to perform the duties
of a soldier, nor can he perform
much of the physical labour
of a farmer, yet could be of
great service to his family and
the interest of his little farm by
planning, directing and procuring
labours to till his land; and
thus, he might be enabled to pro-
vide for the wants of his family
who might otherwise fall the
necessaries of life, and without
the assistance of others become
objects of charity, a burden upon
the State. Mr. Brooks was sum-
moved months ago ordered by one
of the Confederate Enrolling Office
sent to report at Macon,
where he has been retained in
one of the hospitals in despite of his crippled condition and the frequent efforts of himself and his friends to get a discharge. Mr. B. S. said he wished to get over a detail to stay on his farm obliging himself to let the government have whatever of produce he might raise which would be absolutely necessary for the support of his family.

Upon a review of the facts set forth above, you find the case such as one as justly comes under your cognizance and claims your official interposition, and will interest yourself to procure for Mr. B. S. either a discharge or a detail, you will receive the lasting gratitude of himself and his affluence and dependent family.

With distinguished respect,

[Signature]
Peavolt, Sec Leo, 30
Mar 4, 1864

Col. R. Smith

Securing care of
Mr. Brooks

Ann Jul 1864

LH 18
Applicants for the appointment of Lt Broom of Chilhowee Co as 1st Genr. Nov 5 1804
Middletown Nov 7th 1864

Col. J. Brannourth

June 2nd

Shaw-central

Utah and how better Globe Territory
I trust you will both to set the
matter close before the Superior Court
of this session. I will be glad to see
you when you come to the Court

[Signature]

[Signature]
New Berne County, Nov. 30, 1864

Gentlemen, Joseph & Brown,

Dear Sir: I now take the liberty of dropping you a few lines to let you know how we are getting along. The soldiers' wives of Colquitt county we have now nobody to work is paring bad. I have 5 in family my children are too small to work and I am here without corn and cannot buy a bushel without paying 8 to 10 dollars for it. The rich men that is sworn to sell soldiers' family corn at government price will not sell them at any price whatever. I have called on several of them for corn and they say they have the corn but will not take government price for it and are sworn not to take any more and they will not sell at all and I cannot work for money enough to keep my children from suffering. I have bags enough to make my meal if I could get corn to gather them. My husband has been in the service nearly 3 years. Though I heard last week that he is dead and if he is he died a faithful soldier and when he was here I did not lack for anything. My heart is full of grief to think my all is gone. I don't care anything of importance our court uses a great deal of partiality. They want to have it get in and Henry gay is the other.
and if there is not some amendment made
me and my children must suffer
and many others I don't know who else. To
apply to only you for assistance
I think the deserters will steal nearly all there is
in the country & am here in the midst of
them and because I will not be a friend
for them. They are mad and have threatened
to burn my house and all they and their
friends can say will not make me a friend
to a deserter. Nothing more at present

Yours with respect

G. S. Brown

Elizabeth A. Fields

[Other handwriting and annotations on the page]
Eaknton Ga. Oct 9th 1864

Governor Dear Sir

I see your reply to letter, and beg leave to say that were I not in such destitute circumstances, my first request with you make me easy, but I am old and unable to be without a book or medicine of any kind, for I lost all my clothing except what I had on is a poor thing in deed, for practice. I had 5 or 6 thousand dollars on my books but the books are lost and all my patrons scattered throughout the State. If the Legislature would appropriate a small amount for the present distressed and destitute condition, so that I could commence business at once, it might be in my power soon to pay the amount back some help, I mean in the form of a loan, or in any way or form which your honor might suggest. You will please excuse me for calling.
Dear Sir,

Your attention the second time to my Case, I only desired to clearly represent myself to you, so that you might see the little good my appearance done me and the circumstances. You are in my hurry and the second part should not be convenient to you. One may position to a Department that would relieve me for the present or help me through your influence by the Legislature or in any other way, you will greatly oblige a truly affectionate

Hon. Jos. E. Brown,
Gov., State Georgia.

Nov. 11th, 1844 — Ankle in last year, but this account is incorrect.
Macon 10 Nov. 1864

Dear Bro. Brown,

The Trustees of the Georgia Assoc. for Orphans wish to obtain a charter of incorporation from the Legislature. Is there a constitutional obstacle? If not, will you please request Judge Stephens, Judge Eggart or some other gentleman to attend to the matter for us. N.E. Marshall can give the names of the Trustees.

The title should be "The Trustees of the Georgia Association for Orphans."

If the thing cannot be done please write me, Augusta, Care of E. Headman.

Very truly,

N. M. Crawford

We are going to put the Orphans Home through without defalcation, if the Lord will.
Executive Department

Middletown. Nov. 14, 1864

Hon. James A. Seddon, Secretary of War.

Sir:

Official engagements have prevented earlier attention to your letter of 8th inst. which reached me on the 20th.

You are pleased to characterize a portion of my letter as acrimonious, and claim that I have transcended the bounds of official propriety, and seem to desire me to understand that you labor under difficulties in restraining yourself within the limits of forbearance in your reply. As the acrimony of my letter consisted in a simple narrative of truths communicated in a plain, straightforward manner, calling things by their right name, I feel that I am due you no apology. Of course no personal disrespect was intended. I am dealing not with individuals, but with great principles, and with the conduct of an administration of the government of which your department is but one branch. And if you will not consider the remark acrimonious I will add that the people of my state not being dependent and never intending to be upon that government for the privilege of exercising their natural and constitutional rights, nor the Executive of the State for his official existence, I shall on all occasions feel at liberty to exercise perfect independence in the discharge of my official obligations, with no other restraints than those thrown around one by a sense
of duty and the Constitution of my country and the laws of my State. You remark that this is the first instance in the annals of the Confederacy of a suggestion of a doubt on the right of the President to make such a call and the obligation of compliance by the State Executive. Doubtless you are right, as this is unquestionably the first instance in the annals of either the old or the new Confederacy of such a call made by the President. It presents the isolated case of an attempt by the President to single out a particular state and by grasping into his own hands its whole military strength, to divest it of its last vestige of power to maintain its sovereignty; not only denying to it the right plainly reserved in the Constitution to keep troops in time of war when actually invaded, but claiming the power to deprive it of its whole militia and leave it not a man to aid in the execution of its laws, or to suppress civil insurrection in its midst.

The President demands that Georgia shall turn over to him, and relinquish her command and control, over every militiaman now organized by her Executive, and all he may be able to organize. This militia is composed mainly of a class of men and boys between ages not subject by the laws of Congress to serve in the Confederate armies. The President calls for all the state has of the above description. As no such requisition was ever before made upon any state, and it probably never entered into the mind of any statesman that such a call ever would be made, it never became necessary to question the right to make it.

You cite the case of the refusal of the Governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut during the last war with Great Britain to furnish troops for the Common defense upon the requisition of the
President of the United States, and say it must be admitted that my course is analogous to theirs "in all particulars," and that there was more plausibility in their case than in mine in the grounds assigned for refusal. Let us test this statement by the standard of truth. You say the cases are analogous "in all particulars." I deny that they are analogous in any particular.

To show the character of that call I quote the language of President Monroe.

"It will be recollected that when a call was made on the militia of that State for service in the late war, under an arrangement which was alike applicable to the militia of all the States and in Conformity with the acts of Congress the Executive of Massachusetts refused to comply with the call." That was a call under an arrangement alike applicable to the militia of all the States. This is not a call made under an arrangement alike applicable to the militia of all the States or indeed of any of the other States. This is a call for all the militia which the Executive of Georgia has organized, or may be able to organize. No such call was made by the President upon the militia of any other State. The analogy fails then at the very first step. But let us trace it a little further. That was a call for men within the age required to do military service in armies of the United States. This is a call for men exempt by law from military service in the armies of the Confederate States. That was a call for militia who were not in service, but were at home attending to their ordinary pursuits. This is a call for militia, who at the time it was made were, and for months past had been, in actual service most of the time in the
No 3 By a Code for the Army 

From the Document an Act Clouds Ann Arbor Mi

Pursuant to an Act of Congress, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has been

Declared to be a City of this Act and of the Congress

Council of the United States, this is to be hereby enacted that the

Pursuant to the Act, the Secretary of State shall

Council of the United States, is hereby therefore

Pursuant to the Act, this Act is declared to be a law of

Pursuant to the Act, this Act is declared to be a law of the United States of America.
trenches around Atlanta, under the constant fire of the guns of the enemy. In that case the Governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to place the militia of those states under the command of a federal General. In this case the militia had already been placed by the Governor of Georgia under the command of a Confederate General, where they were on the very day the call was made, and had been for months previous. In that case the Governors of those states adjudged that no emergency existed to justify the call for the militia after the President had decided that it did, and they refused to order them into the field. In this case the Governor of Georgia admitted that the emergency did exist, and had ordered them in months before the President saw the emergency and called for the services of the militia. In that case the President was making an honest effort to get the militia of Massachusetts and Connecticut into service, to aid in repelling any assaults that might be made by the enemy. In this case the President, after the Militia of Georgia had been called out by the Governor and put into service, was using his official influence, as shown by General Orders Nos. 63 and 67 issued by his Adjutant General, to get the Militia of Georgia out of service, where they were confronting the enemy and shedding their blood in the defense of their state. When they were in the trenches under the fire of the enemy, the President held out as a reward for their delinquency in case of their desertion from the state militia and return home, a guaranty of the privilege of remaining there in local companies, to be called out only in emergencies to defend their own Counties and Vicinage.
privilege of remaining there in local companies, to be called out only in emergencies to defend their own Counties and Vicinity.

I append to this letter paragraphs of General Orders No. 63 and a paragraph of General Orders No. 67 by reference to which it will be seen that all detailed men were required, and all exempt from Confederate Service invited to enroll themselves in local companies at home, with promise that they should only be called out in emergencies to defend the Counties of their residences and contiguous Counties. The present Militia of Georgia are composed of exempt from Confederate Service, and such detailed men as are not in the military service of the Confederate States. The Militia of the State, then at the front, was composed of men of these classes only. The order was addressed to all men of both classes. The President denied the right of the Governor of Georgia to call out the detailed men for service, and would if consistent stand ready to protect them in case they would desert the militia service, and return home and join his local companies. Thus the strong temptation of remaining at home was held out by the President to these men, if they would ingloriously abandon Atlanta when beleaguered by the enemy, and after desertion from the militia, enlist in Confederate Service which would give the President the entire command of them, and enable him to destroy the militia organization of the State. Fortunately the temptation succeeded in inducing but a small proportion of the militia to desert and return home. They were generally true men and stood gallantly by
their colors, knowing that the country needed their services at the
front, and not in local companies in the rear. General Order No. 63 was
issued on the 6th of August, and was followed by General Order No. 67 on
the 16th of the same month. The President then waited two weeks, and as
the militia still remained in the trenches around Atlanta, he found
it necessary to change his policy and resort to a requisition upon one
for the whole militia of the State as the only means left of accomplishing
his object.

President Madison offered no such inducements to, and made
no such requisitions upon the militia of Massachusetts and Connect-
icut. As much for the analogy of the two cases. But you are
as unfortunate in your facts as in your analogy, as will be further
seen by your statement that the "judicial tribunals determined
adversely to the pretensions of the Governor." By reference to the 3d
Volume Massachusetts Reports supplement page 549, you will
find that the Judges of the supreme Court of that State had the
case before them, and determined every point made by Governor Strong
in his favor and "adversely to the pretensions" of the President.

But you remind me that the 10,000 militia which
you say I had organized, with those I was proceeding to orga-
nize, if incorporated with the veteran regiments prior to the first of
May, would have been an invaluable acquisition to the army of Ten-
nessee, and not improbably have hurled back the invaders from the
Thresholds of my State. If this were true and the movements and
strength of the enemy were so much better understood by the President
than by myself, as you would have the Country believe, why was it
that the President made no call for the Militia in May when the
armies were above Dalton? Why was the call delayed till the 30th of August two days before Atlanta fell, and then mailed to one too late to reach Milledgeville till after the fall? If the control of the whole Militia of the State by the President was so essential to the defense of Atlanta, how do you account for the neglect of the President to call for them till after the Campaign had ended in the surrender of the City to the enemy?

Seeing that the President did not seem to appreciate the emergency, and the danger to Atlanta, upon consultations with that Fortress General and distinguished soldier Joseph E. Johnston I had ordered the militia to report to him and aid the gallant army of Tennessee. I first ordered out the civil and military officers of the State when the armies were near Dalton, and afterwards called out the reserved Militia including all between 16 and 55 years of age, when they were near Tennessee. During all this time and for nearly two months afterward no call was made by the President for their services. If the statements you now make are correct, surely such neglect by the President in so critical an emergency involves little less than criminality.

Again, you state as one of the inducements to the call that I had stated in official correspondence that I had ten thousand Militia organised — that a portion of these were known to be with the army of Tennessee in some auxiliary relation — only a limited number however, not believed to constitute half the number reported by me to be actually organised.

You are again incorrect in your facts, and unfortunately ignorant of the strength of the force that was under your command.
In the official correspondence to which I suppose you allude, I did not state that I had organized two thousand militia. The language used was "nearly ten thousand armed men." At that time the two regiments of the state line who are regular troops for the war numbered nearly 1500. They too were placed under the Confederate Commanders, and nearly 500 of them while under his command have been disabled or lost upon the battle field. But if I had made the statement as you incorrectly charge, it would have been true.

The tri-monthly report forwarded by Major General J.W. Smith, who commands the Division of State Militia, to General Hood, dated 10th September 1864 but a few days after the fall of Atlanta, showed upon the muster rolls of his Division 9,170. This report did not include the Regiment of Fulton County Militia, which had been detached for local service in the city under the command of Brigadier General W.L. Bright of the Confederate Army, nor the Regiment of Troop County Militia which was stationed by the Commanding General at West Point under Brigadier General Tylor of the Confederate Army. Nor did it include the two regiments of the state line which had been ordered into other divisions of the Army of Tennessee. Nor did it include the Battalions of Cadets of the Georgia Military Institute who did gallant service in the trenches of Atlanta. Nor did it embrace the names of the gallant dead of this Division who never turned their backs to the enemy; but fell upon the battle field or died in the Hospital. These had rendered the last service in the power of the patriot to their country, before the President saw the necessity which induced him to
call for them, and as they slept at the date of his call in the soldiers' grave they were unfortunately unable to respond. But if you say that the whole ten thousands were not in the trenches with muskets in their hands, I reply that while many were sick and some absent without leave, a larger proportion of the number upon the muster rolls were there, than probably any other Division in General Hood's Army. And judging from the late speech of the President in Macon a larger number than the usual average in the armies of the Confederacy.

As I understand your letter you deny that it was the purpose of the President to disband or disorganize the militia, and say he intended to take the organization with all its officers and maintain it. I do not pretend to quote your language but state what I understand to be the substance. Unfortunately your own record contradicts you. In the Requisitions made by you occurs this sentence, "Those within the limits of General Hood's Department will report to him; those outside to the Commandant of the Department of South Carolina and Georgia." The line between these Departments cuts in two General Smith's Division and probably three of the four Brigades of which it is composed, and the Requisition orders that part of this Division and those Brigades on one side of it to report to General Hood then at Atlanta, and that part on the other side to the Commandant whose Head Quarters were at Charleston. But this was not all; it amounted to an order in advance, if I had responded to the
call, to a large proportion of the militia then under arms, to leave Atlanta in the very crisis of its fate, and return home and report to General Jones whose head quarters were at Charleston. This would not only have permanently divided and disbanded the militia organization as it existed under the laws of the state, but would have aided the President in carrying out his policy already referred to of withdrawing the militia from Atlanta before its fall, and compelling armed men then aiding in the defence to leave, and report to a Commandant upon the Coast where there was no attack anticipated from the enemy. So determined was the President to accomplish both these objects that he did not pretend to conceal his purpose but incorporated it into the requisition itself. Past experience has also shown that the President will surmount all obstacles to secure to himself the appointment of the officers who are to command troops under his control. Soon after the commencement of the war, Georgia tendered to him an excellent Brigade of her most gallant men, fully armed and equipped, with two months training in camp of instruction. He refused to accept it as it was but disbanded it, and refusing to recognize the Commanding General though every officer, I believe in the Brigade, from the highest to the lowest, petitioned to have him retained, scattered the Regiments into other Brigades. The twelve months men entered the service with officers elected by them, and he accepted them with their officers. The Constitution of the Confederate States as I have hitherto most conclusively shown, and as the legislature of this state has resolved, as well as the laws of the State authorize them to elect officers to fill
all vacancies that occur. The President has disregarded his right and claims and exercises the right to appoint all such officers for them. His past course, as well as the plain language of the requisition shows that you misrepresent the President when you deny that it was his purpose in making the requisition to disband the militia; and I am satisfied that I do him no injustice in supposing that it was his intention after they were disbanded to appoint his own partisans and favorites to command them.

Reference is made in your letter to the act of Congress to show that the President could only hold the militia six months under a call upon the Governor for their services. You seem to forget that many of those then in service for whom he called, had already served nearly four months. And you seem to suppose that I will be unmindful how easy it would be at the end of six months for the President simply to renew the call for another six months, and continue this to the end of the war, and in this way keep the old men and boys of Georgia constantly in service to the destruction of all his agricultural and other material interest, while no such requirement is made of any other state. But if this were not possible, by these repeated calls, what guarantee have they under the act of Congress and the promise of the President, that they would be disbanded at the end of six months? The original twelve months once entered the service under the like protection as they supposed of an act of Congress and a solemn contract with the President, that they should be discharged at the end of their time. But before the time expired, the President
procured another act of Congress, which changed the law on that subject, and he then refused to be bound by his Contract, and those of them who survive are put in service near the end of the fourth year. Even the furloughs promised them were not allowed. And ministers of religion who made a contract with the Government to serve for one year, and others who agreed to serve three years in the ranks, are held after the expiration of their time, when they would be embraced in the exemptions act which protects those at home, if the Government had kept its faith and discharged them according to the Contract.

In this connection I must also notice your remarks in reference to the six months men of last fall in this state. And as every material statement you now make upon that subject is contradicted by the Records of your department made up over your own signature, the task is an unpleasant one.

You say “It had been designed to raise troops for special defence and local service for the war with the obligation of service as the general rule throughout the State to constitute a part of the Provisional army, and to be subject to the call of the President when needed”. If this statement means anything it is intended to mean, that the call was made on me for the troops to serve for the war with obligation as the general rule to do service throughout the State. That is what you now say. What did you then say? I quote from your requisition of 6th June 1863:

“The President has therefore determined to make a
acquisition on the Governors of the several states to furnish by
an appointed time for service within the state and for the
limited period of six months a number of men" &c. Again
in the same acquisition you say, "I am instructed by the Pres-
ident in his name to make on you a requisition for
eight thousands men to be furnished by your state for the period
of six months from the first day of August next unless in
the intermediate time a Volunteer force organized under the law
for local defence and special service of at least an equal
number, be mustered and reported as subject to his call for
service within your state."

This does not look much like the call was made for troops
for the war.

Was it for troops to serve as the general gale throughout
the state? I quote from the same document. You say it becomes es-
cential that the reserves of our population capable of bearing
arms &c., be relied on for employment in the local defence of
important cities and in repelling in emergencies the sudden
or transient incursions of the enemy." Again "Local organi-
zations or enlistments by volunteering for limited periods
and special purposes, if they can be induced, would afford
more assurance of prompt and efficient action." You then
refer to the two acts of Congress for local defence and special
service and enclose copies of them and call my attention to
them. And you proceed to say,
Under the former of these, if organizations could be effected, with the limitations prescribed in their muster rolls of service only at home or at specified points of importance within the particular state, they would be admirably adapted to obtain the desired end.” In speaking of the inducements to be held out to those who will form Volunteer Companies under the act of Congress upon speak of them as “Organizations for special service within the State under officers of their own selection and with privilege of remaining at home in the pursuit of their ordinary avocations unless when called for a temporary exigency to active duty.” In reference to the service to be performed by these organizations upon them use this language, “Without the general disturbance of a call on the militia, the organizations nearest to the points of attack would always be readily summoned to meet the emergency, and the population resident in cities and their vicinities would without serious interruption to their business or domestic engagements stand organized and prepared to man their entrenchments and defend under the most animating incitements their property and homes.” You remark again “After the most active and least needed portions of the reserves were embodied under the former law, the latter would allow smaller organizations with more limited range of service for objects of police and the pressing contingencies of neighborhood defense. Could these laws be generally acted on it is believed as full organizations of the reserve population would be secured for casual needs as would be practicable.”
There is not a word in any of this, about service as the general rule throughout the state. But every expression looks to local and limited service in sudden emergencies, such as the sudden incursions of the enemy, and to the defense of their own homes, and the entrenchments around them; by those who live in cities, "in neighborhood defense," "casual service," with the clear promise to all that so soon as such emergency had passed they should be permitted to return home and attend to their "ordinary avocations" their "business or domestic engagements." The troops we collect how this promise was kept. But you charge that I had formed non-descript organizations not conforming to the regulations of the provisional army - scant in men, and abounding in officers, with every variety of obligation for local service generally of the most restricted character, and for the brief period of six months. Each organization formed by one was in conformity to the statutes copies of which you enclosed as the guides for my action and the exact titles to be given in your instructions given. Each had the number of men specified in the statutes, and no one of them had a super-numerary officer, with any consent, or as far as I know or believe. The requisitions expressly authorized one to accept troops for local defense of the most restricted character, with the "limitations prescribed in their annetice rolls of service only at home or at specified points of importance." But while you expressly authorized this I refused to do it, except in case of companies of mechanics and other workmen in cities - the operatives in factories, and the employees of Railroads, where the nature of their avocations made it actually...
necessary. In all other cases I refused to accept the companies when tendered—if their muster rolls did not cover and bind them to defend at least one fourth of the whole territory of the state. Many of them covered the whole territory of the State with their muster rolls. Some complaints were made at my course because I required more than was required by either the acts of Congress or the acquisition of the Secretary of War.

Another charge is that when called out “Scarce a decent division of four thousand men could be mustered for the field, and then only for six months.” Your omissions of facts as well as of records is indeed remarkable. Only those whose muster rolls embraced Atlanta and the territory between it and the Tennessee line were called out till near the end of the period for which all were enlisted, and you got a Division of many more than four thousand within that boundary. The others over twelve thousand were at home engaged in their “ordinary avocations” ready to respond to your call in case of an “emergency” or “sudden incursion of the enemy.” But you never called for any of them till a short time before the end of the term of their enlistment. Those you then called out you never even armed, and it was believed by them that they were only assembled for the convenience of the Conscription Officers to save them the trouble of searching the county to see if any among them were subject to Conscription. No body pretended that there was any “emergency” or “sudden incursion of the enemy” at the time of the last call, in the sections of the State they had agreed to defend. I have gone thus fully into this regard for the purpose of showing the palpable injustice which you attempt to do me and of exposing the flimsy pretext under which you seek to defend the bad faith which was exercised by the Government towards the gallant men who by their
prompt response more than doubly filled your acquisition, in its letter and spirit.

But for the interruptions of our militia organization which grew out of the Conscription act of fifty last, instead of ten thousand I could have sent to Atlanta near thirty thousand to aid in its defence.

The Legislature of the State unfortunately turned over to the President's control that part of the organized militia within the ages specified in the act of Congress, and when the hour of peril came, out of all the large number embraced in the act of Congress, and turned over to his control by the resolution of the legislature, he had not a single one at the front with a musket in his hand, to aid in the defence of the State. Of all the Confederate reserves, to which the State was told she might safely look for defence, not a man with a musket in his hand was at the front during the whole march of the federal army from Dalton till its triumphal entrance into Atlanta. And if action had been delayed till the President called, as shown by the date of his call, not a man of all the reserve militia of the State would have been there.

The Confederate reserves organized were not sufficiently numerous to guard the unarmed federal prisoners in the State, and I had to furnish, when their services were once needed at the front, a Battalion of militia to aid them.

The interruptions by the state authorities to which you refer is entirely imaginary. After the decision of the legislature your officers were left perfectly free to execute the law of Congress in all its rigor. But if it were real, surely the President will aid his large
force of officers in this state should have been able to get somebody to
the front. A single man with a good musket might have rendered
some assistance. Or if this by reason of insufficiency could not be done,
if he had ordered his corps of Conscript officers there, as I ordered the
state officers, they were sufficiently numerous to have done essential
service. For even this favor at that critical period the people of
Georgia would have been under great obligations to him.

I must not forget another ground of the call as you
turn it, which was that some of these troops (the 10,000 organized militia)
had been detailed for objects not admitted by Enrolling officers in the
state to be authorized by Confederate law, and others were claimed as
primarily liable, or previously subject to Confederate service. This you
may lead "ingenuity controversy" which it was most desirable to "an-
ticipate and preclude." As Confederate Enrolling officers had
denied the right of the State to make details, and had claimed
certain men whom the Governor held as part of the militia of the
state, and as the Governor did not at once yield to the pretensions
of those Confederate officers, but was disposed to contend for the
rights of the State, the President unwilling to allow the Controversy,
determined to relieve the State of her whole militia, by making
acquisitions for it, and taking it all into his own hands, which
would "anticipate and preclude" any further Controversy, as the
state having no militia left need have no further Controversy
about his right to any particular individuals as part of it.

This novel discovery of the President of the mode of settling a Con-
troversied right, and this Magnanimity and Statesmanship dis-
played by him in this affair can not be too highly appreciated.
By imitating this example in future the stronger party can always make a speedy settlement with the weaker, without allowing any unpleasant controversy about rights.

It has been agreeable to you to speak of my action as springing from a spirit of opposition to the Confederate Government, and animosity to the Chief Magistrate. I have but a word of reply to this unjust and ungenerous attack. Some men are unable to distinguish between opposition to a government and unwillingness blindly to endorse all the errors of an administration, or to discriminate between loyalty to a cause, and loyalty to their master. My loyalty is only due to my country, and you can bestow yours where your interest or inclinations may prompt.

I do not consider that the point you attempt to make about the pay and subsistence of the militia while under the Confederate General Commanding the Department, has in it even a shadow of plausibility. They were accepted by him for the time as an organization, and while under his control, he has the absolute Command of them, and the Governor of the State does not exercise the slightest control over them. What possible pretext for saying that he may not order this division subsisted and payed as well as any other division under his command? There is just as much reason for saying that a Division of Georgians under General Lee should not be subsisted and paid by the Confederacy while under his command, as that this Division under General Hood should not be subsisted and paid while he commanded them.

The truth at the bottom of all this is so visible that it can not be concealed even by an attempt to muddle the issue.
I find the statement emphasized by you that the Constitution of the Confederate States does not confer on the States the power to keep troops in time of war. As the States were sovereign and possessed all power when they formed the Constitution which gave life to the Confederate Government, neither that Government nor the Constitution could confer any power on the States. They retained all that they did not confer upon it. But admit your statement and what follows. You were obliged to admit in the first sentence that the States did reserve that power. Having reserved it, they are certainly authorized to exercise it. As you admit they not only reserved this power but the reservation naturally includes whatever is necessary to accomplish the object of it. But you then attempt to explain it away by denying that the Constitution means any thing, and in effect contend that the Confederate Government may take from the State the last one of the troops which she has reserved the power to keep, without violating the reserved rights of the State. In other words, the State has plainly reserved the right to keep troops in time of war, when actually invaded. But this right, you in effect say, is subordinate to the will of the President who may take the last one of them from her whenever he chooses to do so. To justify all this you are driven to the usual plea of necessity. You say it was necessary that the whole militia of Georgia should be in Confederate service and subject not to my judgment or disposal, but to the control of the Constitutional Commander in Chief. I deny that the President is or ever can be, without the
Consent of the State, the Constitutional Commander in Chief of the whole militia of the State. When we take the whole context together
the Constitution is plain upon this point. He is declared to be
the Commander in Chief of the army and Navy of the Confederate
States and of the militia of the several States when called into
the actual service of the Confederate States. Congress has power
to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
Confederate States, suppress insurrections and repel invasions. Congress
has power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the
militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed
in the service of the Confederate States. There comes the qualification.
The States reserve the right to keep troops in time of war when
actually invaded. If she is not invaded under provision made
by Congress they may be called forth if the emergency requires it.
If she is invaded she may keep such part of them as she thinks
proper under her reserved right and they can not be taken without
her consent. The whole case is in a suit-shell. Congress may pro-
vide for calling forth the militia and for governing such part of
them as are employed in the service of the Confederate States. The
President is for the time Commander in Chief of all who are
so employed. And all may be so employed except such as the State
determines to keep by virtue of her reserved right in time of war
when actually invaded. These Congress has no right to call forth
and no right to provide for governing, and of these the President
is not the Constitutional Commander in Chief, but the Governor
of the state is as long as the state keeps them, and she has an un
questionable right to keep them as long as the invasion of her
territory lasts.

This I understand to be the Constitutional right of the state
of Georgia. By this as her Executive I stand and regard
with perfect indifference all assaults upon either my
loyalty or motives, by those who deny this right, or seek to
it from her, to increase their own power or gratify their
own ambition.

A word as to the use I shall make of this militia and
of all the troops at the command of the state. No sentence in
my former letter is an "inconsiderate utterance." No word in
it justifies the construction that I will array my state in
"armed antagonism against the Confederacy." On the contrary
I will use the troops to support and maintain all the just
rights and Constitutional powers of the Confederacy to the fullest
extent. No state is more loyal to the Confederacy than Georgia
and none will make greater sacrifices to maintain its rights, its
just powers, and its Independence. The sacrifices of her people
at home, and the blood of her sons upon the battle field
have abundantly established this truth. But while I will
employ all the force at my command to maintain all the
Constitutional rights of the Confederacy, and of my state, I shall
not hesitate to use the same force to protect the same rights against
external assaults and internal insurrections. Those who imagine
themselves to be the Confederacy, and consider loyalty only to them-
selves as loyalty to it, and who recognize in neither the people
now the states any rights which conflict with their purposes or
in future designs double life see in this the "foreshadowing of a
guilty purpose." It is to say the least a fixed purpose.

It is not only my right but my duty to uphold
the Constitutional rights and liberties of the people of Georgia
by force if necessary against usurpations and abuses of power
by the Central Government. The militia is under the Constitution
one of the proper instrumentalities for that purpose.

There is scarcely a single provision in the Con-
stitution, for the protection of life, liberty or property in Georgia
that has not been and is not now constantly violated by the
Confederate Government through its officers and agents.
It has been but a short time since one of the stores of the
state of Georgia containing property in the peacable possession
of the state was forcibly entered by a Confederate officer and
the property taken thence by force. I had no militia pres-
dent at the time to repel this invasions of the rights of the Sovereign
State, but should have had them there soon if the property had not
be been restored.

A single Confederate Provoost Marshall in Georgia admits
that thirty citizens and soldiers have been shot by his guard
without his right to shoot citizens being questioned, till within
the last few days, when he was greatly encouraged that a true Bill
for murder should have been found by a grand jury against
one of them for shooting down a citizen in the streets, who of-
defended him by questioning his authority over him. Every Citizen
in the state both man and woman, is arrested in the cars
streets and highways, who presume to travel without a pass, they are arrested without law and imprisoned at pleasure of government officials. The houses, lands and effects of the people of Georgia are daily seized and appropriated to the use of the government or its agents, without the shadow of law, without just compensation, and in defiance of the decision of the Supreme judicial tribunal of the state, and the officers of justice are totally resisted by the officers of the Confederate States. The property of the families of soldiers now under arms to sustain the Confederacy is forcibly taken from them, without hesitation, and appropriated in many cases without compensation.

In this state of things the militia are necessary to uphold the civil tribunals of the state, and will be used for that purpose whenever the proper call is made by the proper authorities. No military authority State or Confederate can be lawfully used for any other purpose than to uphold the civil authorities, and as much of it as the Constitution of my country has confided to my hands shall be used for that purpose whether civil society its Constitution and laws shall be invaded from without or from within. Measured by your standard this is undoubtedly disloyalty. Tested by mine it is a high duty to my country.

Respectfully, Jr.

[Signature]

Telamon Cuyler Collection
University of Georgia
As a last means of creating, gunpowder perseveringly observed that they should be held and regarded as
Although, very that cost and "In that case they could not
should be declared an emergency by local officers,
and they naturally induced their resistance for the
full period of their enlistment term of service.
I should have been greatly opposed if you had
been a mass. When Nelson called for two
armies for the period of six months, with
the express purpose that they should
be permitted to remain at home in the
pursuit of the "ordinary Presidents ," except
in "emergency" to meet "emergency in case of the
Enemy." Could not a country's glory
and return been better "emergency in
"Pursuit and transient in case of the enemy,
and resettle on the occurrence of the
emergency. Why could not the same men
living in the same district, under the
democratic purpose to defend the same territory,
against "enemy and transient in case of
the enemy," come be given furlough to return
home and attend to the pursuit of their "advisory
commission of colored militia
and commanded by officer appointed by
the Constitution (ordered by the President) to call
up of colored local companies and commanded
by officer appointed by the President. What
things magic in them about the President's com-
mision which would likely be the
monumented for service in a single day. If the
order to come forth by Wharton, President of
Pennsylvania, which the three main organs for the
same purpose could not set up their effects.
Gone assertion that my past action and public expressions have given encouragement to our enemies, to the mortification of many patriotic citizens of the Confederacy, may be properly disposed of by the single remark, that if we may judge of the encouragement of our enemies by the general expressions of their public journals, the President gave them more delight, hope, and encouragement by his single speech at Boston than all the past acts and public expressions of my life could have done had I labored constantly to aid and encourage them. He who can satisfy the enemy that two-thirds of the men who compose our gallant armies are absent from their posts, affords them delight and encouragement indeed, as they will no longer doubt if this be true, that the spirit of our people is broken, and that our brave defenders can no longer be relied on to sustain our cause in the field.

All remember the mortification which this statement of the President caused to the patriotic citizens of the Confederacy. If it had been true, surely it should not have been publicly proclaimed by the President. But I am satisfied it was not true, and that in making the statement the President did grievous injustice to the brave men who compose our gallant self-sacrificing armies.
Decide a Genevania clause of a state in July, the letting issue to the strong and losing nations of the states. Reserving some amount by and for the benefit of the army.

Money, and any by which shall be destroyed by the enemy. The treaty is ready to reach him. He can do no further harm to the army.

Treaty, the other lands the reserved forces are to be continued. Lastly, and the reserved army to yield to the army.

There remain the reserved forces to be continued, strictly and in case of a battle.

With certain reservations, not the army.

Jewish, an instrument and control by the continued to reserved forces.

The well-established rule is a rule that by Gene.

When at conflicts with the juniper of the

Confederate Administration, and降落

Front in turn of war when actually

It may henceforth into the Confederate States

chosen to call forces to the lost

one of them out of that control.
Kolmesville Ga. Oct. 14th 1864

His Excellency Joseph E. Brown
Milledgeville Ga.

Ferri

When I saw you last I had great determination to make an application for the appointment of Vice-Dean of this Circuit. Since my return home I have been requested by the most influential citizens from all parts of the Circuit to become a candidate, which makes me more anxious on the subject, as I am thoroughly convinced that it will be entirely satisfactory to the people of the District. Therefore your Excellency can conscientiously, in your feelings give me the appointment again, may be assumed that it will be rightly appreciated. I have the honor to be yours Very Respectfully,

W.S. Furr
Home to Cobb May 1st

Doom

The following dispatch sent to C.B. Walker to mix

Milled Nov 13 1944

The cotton braves must be used when needed, to carry the stack.

To report to Sent Cobb

C.B. Walker

Doom
The following dispatch was sent to Genl. G olden of Mt. 
Mills Nov. 17, 1864.

Here have under way Genl. Smith most of the men I can 
 furnish without further legislation. I ask the legislation to 
day to authorize me to make a levy on Mape. Hope they 
will do so. Now many can you arm? As one accuses is 
that there are not arms, I wish a reply on the subject immi-
 diately. To aid in getting the bills through. Will give direc-
tions about trains as you request.

J. E. B.
unusual long transcript

of 17 Capes to the Capt in exchange for

the 12 Barrels of Powder in the

Canter you see here. You must take a

value upon the 3 barrels. I now through that

money with the least possible delay forward

of one & 200s whereas for the 2 barrels

in the present bond of 1783 the Capt. I shall

say in 1745 that you can make extraneous

the other 300s plus 50s on the 3 barrels.

The other would payable to William to

in quicksmart. I believe you will endeavor

in order to prevent according

these 2 barrels you will have a copy of

these that caused the Capt to release the lady

of the bond or demand that lends. Can figure the

words I forward them at soon as possible

I am not aware where the stock of 1783

has the agent in Charleston or in the

other permanent. I have quantities of Ordnance

and 5 barrels to shoot for this. I had

get you if I can get some. The words

of the Retaining Knight will also be paid here.

By this means

Franklin, Britten
HightColony

Cumm. J. W. Brown

Willingill

10th Apr. 1863

I have shipped for P.O. City 12 Bales Blankets and 17
Sewing Cases Cotton Cards at 3$ per bale

The half the freight payable

Then the remaining half paid in the
Confederate. Either in standing or Steam

At present rates in Confederate Money.

In this mode I can get a grate point in
12 Blankets, and at the time Sherman

You will send 16 Bales enough in Georgia

100 or 120 Blankets. Now digit upon ten

Your reply in reference to this please so

 Yours very respectfully

John L. Bailes
Shipped, in good order and condition, by [JOHNSON & BROTHER], on board the steam ship called the [Rabid], whereof [Randle] is Master, now lying at the port of Nassau, N. P., and bound for a Confederate Port. To say:

Seven: (Blank)

(blah)

being marked and numbered as in the margin, and are to be delivered in the like order and condition, at [a Confederate Port] (the dangers of the seas only excepted,) unto [Col.], or to [assigns], he or they paying freight for the said at [rate], with primate and average accustomed. In Witness whereof, the master or pursuer of the said vessel hath affixed to [Bills of Lading], all of this tenor and date, one of which being accomplished, the others to stand void.

Dated in Nassau, the 10th day of November, 1860.

All War Bills of Exchange Excepted.

[Signature: ...]
His Excellency

Governor

Executive Office

Milledgeville

Georgia
Mr. E. Bolling
Joseph E. Brown
Milledgeville
By W. J. B. Braman
Georgia